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ivThis paper focuses on sharpening the debate on the financial sector by analysing the
competitive behaviour and the structure–performance correlation. In line with the
literature on the measurement of competition, it follows the two mainstreams — non-
structural and the structural approaches — in analysing the nature of competition and
market structure of Uganda’s financial system.
By using the non-structural models of competitive behaviour—the Panzar-Rosse
model—the study measures competition and emphasizes the competitive conduct of
banks without using explicit information about the structure of the market. Estimations
indicate monopolistic competition, competition being weaker in  1995–1999 compared
with 2000–2005. Moreover, the relationship between competition, measuring conduct,
and concentration measuring the market structure, is negative and statistically significant;
which could suggest that a few large banks can restrict competition. Overall, the results
suggest that while competition in the Ugandan banking sector falls within a range of
estimates for comparator markets, it tends to be on the weaker side.
The structural approach to model competition includes the structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) paradigm and the efficiency hypothesis. Using the SCP framework,
we investigate whether a highly concentrated market causes collusive behaviour among
larger banks resulting in superior market performance; whereas under the efficiency
hypothesis we test whether it is the efficiency of larger banks that makes for enhanced
performance. Using Granger causation test, we establish that the efficiency Granger
causes concentration and using instrumental variable approach, the study establishes
that market power and concentration as measured by market share and Herfindahl
index, respectively, positively affect bank profitability. In addition, bank efficiency also
affects bank profitability. Other factors that affect bank profitability include operational
costs, taxation and core capital requirement.
A major policy implication derived from this analysis is that the Ugandan banking
system has been subject to deep structural transformation since the early 1990s.
Advances in information technology, liberalization of international capital movement,
consolidation and privatization have permitted economies of scale in the production
and distribution of services and increased risk diversification. These forces have led to
lower costs and, undoubtedly, higher efficiency. However, to ensure that lower costs
are passed through to households and firms, greater efficiency must be accompanied
by a similar strengthening in the competitive environment in the banking sector.
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Statement of the research problem
F
inancial  markets  and  institutions  are  central  to  economic
development and growth. In a perfect world characterized by an Arrow-Debreu
economy, there is no role for the financial services sector and intermediation, in
general. In this perfect world there is a complete set of state contingent claims, and
transaction costs are absent, making the role of financial intermediation irrelevant. The
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argument further underpins the perfect economy world
where financing decisions of firms are irrelevant to the value of the firm. In this case
the financial intermediation process does exist, but the way it is utilized is irrelevant to
the value of the firm. In reality, though, the economy is imperfect and exhibits transaction
and information acquisition costs. In this respect the existence of financial intermediaries
such as banks becomes necessary because they assist in the acquisition of information
about firms and households and will alter the allocation of credit in the economy. Indeed,
any contractual arrangement that ensures the repayment of loans will encourage savers
and lenders to lend and this influences the savings pattern. The existence of capital
markets allows households and firms to insure against consumption shocks and allocate
consumption across time and space via the trading of security instruments.
Financial systems tend to evolve around a banking sector seeking to achieve
economies of scale in order to offset the costs of collecting and processing information
designed to reduce uncertainty thereby facilitating a more efficient allocation of financial
resources. The importance of a strong banking sector to a country’s economic growth
and development is well-established in the literature (Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000;
Levine, 1997). Efficient financial systems help countries to grow, partly by widening
access to external finance and channelling resources to the sectors that need them
most. A well-developed financial system can also help an economy cope better with
exogenous shocks such as terms of trade volatility and move them away from natural
resource-based development. In a well-functioning economy, banks tend to act as
quality controllers for capital seeking successful projects, ensuring higher returns and
accelerating output growth. It is necessary for the banking system to be competitive,
however, in order to ensure that banks are effective forces for financial intermediation
channelling savings into investment fostering higher economic growth.
Banks are the predominant financial institutions in most developing countries and in
Uganda comprise over 80% of the financial system. Banks are the primary mechanisms
for the transmission of monetary policy and they play an important role in determining
the supply of money in the economy. They also form the backbone of the payments
system. Therefore, changes in the structure and performance of banks can have far-
reaching implications for the whole economy. Uganda’s banking industry is highly
concentrated and many studies in the banking literature elsewhere and in the more
general industrial organization literature find a positive statistical relationship between
performance and measures of market structure – either concentration or market share.
This could therefore suggest that the recent wave of buyouts and mergers in Uganda’s
banking industry is motivated by the prospective benefits from greater market power
created by increasing the concentration or market shares of the merging banks. The3 RESEARCH PAPER 203
traditional structure-conduct-performance hypothesis asserts that this finding reflects
the setting of prices that are less favourable to consumers (lower deposit rates, higher
loan rates) in more concentrated markets as a result of competitive imperfections in
these markets. This study is therefore intended to enrich the debate on the nature of
competition and the market structure and performance of Uganda’s banking sector.
Moreover,sinceUganda’sfinancialsectorhasgonethroughreforms,itisimportantto
understand their impact on the structure of the industry and therefore perhaps deduce
how they are likely to affect the growth potential of the economy.Aprevious study by
Nannyonjo (2002) on the impact of the structure of Uganda’s banking sector and its
effect on profitability indicated no significant impact. This could have resulted from
misspecification as efficiency could cause concentration and market share would
therefore bias the results if all of these variables are assumed to be weakly exogenous
in the profits reduced form equation. Here we extend this concept by testing for
causationandadoptingappropriatespecificationandestimationmethods.
Literaturesuggestsarelationshipbetweencompetitionandefficiencyandbetween
market structure and performance. These relationships have generated competing
hypotheses.Ononehand,thetraditionalcollusionhypothesis,alsocalledthestructure-
conduct-performance hypothesis (Bain, 1951), proposes that market concentration
lowersthecostofcollusionbetweenfirmsandresultsinhigherthannormalprofits.On
the other hand, the efficient structure hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973) postulates an
alternativeexplanationfortheexistenceofapositivecorrelationbetweenconcentration
andprofitability,affirmingthatthemostefficientfirmsobtaingreaterprofitabilityand
market share and, consequently, the market becomes more concentrated. In this case,
the positive observed relationship between concentration and profits is spurious and
simply proxies for the relationship among superior efficiency, market share and
concentration.
This study is particularly relevant for Uganda’s economy given the high degree of
concentrationinitsbankingmarket.Itisimportanttodeterminethelevelofcompetition
andhowthisislinkedtoconcentration,andwhetherthestructureofthebankingsystem





a result of unfavourable interest rates.
Broadly, the knowledge about bank behaviour, pricing and efficiency in Uganda is
limited. There is a gap in empirical work on whether market concentration and/or
efficiency of the banking system have increased in the era of financial liberalization.
Thisstudyanalysestherelationshipbetweenbanksperformanceintermsofreturnson
assets and market structure (concentration and market share) applying stochastic
frontier approach to estimate a direct measure of efficiency of Ugandan banks. The
study particularly contributes to the scanty empirical evidence on the behaviour of
structure-performance of banks under a liberalized financial system in Uganda.COMPETITION AND PERFORMANCE IN UGANDA’S BANKING SYSTEM 4
Objectives of the study
A
 financial system’s contribution to the economy depends on the quantity and
quality of its services and the efficiency with which it provides them. As
mentioned above, by the late 1980s a repressive government, interest rate
controls and non-price rationing mechanisms severely undermined Uganda’s financial
sector and significantly retarded its development (Kasekende and Atingi-Ego, 2003).
Ambitious reforms were initiated later aimed at redefining the structure and operation
of the system and the subsequent easing of entry, removing financial taxation by
eliminating mandatory investments and reducing the reserve requirement ratio, phasing
out direct monetary policy, privatizing the state-owned financial institutions, and
strengthening prudential norms. The impact and experience of the reforms offer no
simple solution to the pre-reform glaring deficiencies particularly in terms of the
dominance of the industry by few institutions, limited credit extension, and high and
rising intermediation margins. In particular, a weak financial market limits the efficient
aggregation and allocation of resources and subsequently causes waste in those sectors
and enterprises that are less well linked into the financial pipelines. Moreover, the
recent reforms, particularly the privatization of the dominant Uganda Commercial Bank
(UCB) and consolidation within the banking system, may have resulted in a sound but
uncompetitive and thus inefficient system that could have failed to deliver on greater
access and financial deepening although they could have increased the sector’s
profitability.
Uganda’s banking industry is undergoing unprecedented changes, caused by the
deregulation of financial services, strengthening of regulatory and supervision
frameworks, and developments in information technology. An integral part of the process
has been the liberalization of international capital movements. Many of these changes
could have had vast implications for competition and concentration in the banking and
financial sectors. The combination of improvements and unfulfilled potential warrants
a new look at Ugandan banking sector. One of the consequences has been mergers
and buyouts which has increased concentration.i This process of concentration may
affect competition, in particular on local markets for retail banking services. Questions
may arise such as: Should concentration be slowed down? Or are additional measures
needed to ensure sufficient competition in Uganda’s banking industry? Besides, increased
concentration and the size of the global players may cause concerns about financial
stability. In order to judge the implications of these developments, one has to examine
the banking industry’s current market structure so as to determine the degree of
competition and to investigate the impact the concentration is likely to have on the
market structure and the behaviour of banks.
A high degree of competition and efficiency in the banking system can contribute to
greater financial stability, product innovation, and access by households and firms to
financial services, which can in turn improve the prospects for economic growth. In
this respect, there is a concern that a monopolistic or oligopolistic, inefficient, and
fragile banking sector in Uganda is a major hindrance to economic development.




inancial markets and institutions are central to economic develop
ment and growth. Increasingly, scholars acknowledge that supportive policy for
financial sector development is a key component of national development policy.
A comparative analysis of the growth rates of different countries has produced
convincing evidence that having a deeper financial system contributes to growth – and
is not merely a reflection of prosperity (Honohan and Beck, 2007). Moreover, the
development of the financial sector is fundamental to the conduct of monetary policy.
Countries with deep financial systems also seem to have a lower incidence of poverty
than others at the same level of national income. At the firm level, firm growth responds
to access to credit and to the conditions that favour such access.
The economies of East Asia have shown how putting national savings to work in
productivity—increasing investment can sustain rapid growth. In Asia and Latin America,
micro finance innovations have helped low-income households manage risks through
savings (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2004; Beck, et al., 2000; Honohan , 2004).
Such innovations have empowered energetic micro-entrepreneurs, giving them the
first step up the ladder of prosperity and lifting living standards in the areas where they
operate. Innovations in the technology for remittances and novel techniques in insurance
have also played an important role in improving welfare. By bridging the gap between
savers and entrepreneurs, financial systems not only reduce the risks on both sides but
also open up opportunities to both sides. They can reduce the barriers to entry for
entrepreneurs, thereby allowing the economy at large to benefit in terms of increasing
employment, improving the price and quality of services, and reducing the stifling
influence of established monopolies. Given access to the necessary finance, farmers
can move to a higher level of productivity and output. Savers, too, can share in the
returns on an expanded flow of investment. Housing, insurance and pension
arrangements can be lifted to a new plane.
2. Cursory sketch of Uganda’s
financial systemCOMPETITION AND PERFORMANCE IN UGANDA’S BANKING SYSTEM 8
The Ugandan banking system has been subject to deep structural transformation











There has been considerable progress in expanding the outreach of the informal
financial institutions and improving the access to financial services especially by the
rural population. Despite the proliferation, however, several commercial banks were
closed; in fact, the commercial bank branch network of about 187 in 2008 compared
with290in1972appearstodepictacontrarypictureoftheindustry.Thisresultedina





region (Meyer et al., 2004). However, this could also be a reflection of a switch from
investment in branches to investment in communication networks and information
technology.
While Uganda has a well-developed and diversified microfinance industry, it
nonethelesssufferslowcapitalizationandlegalrestrictions.Thesehandicapslimitthe
industry’sabilitytomeetthedevelopmentfinanceneedsoftheruralandmicroenterprise
sectors that form the bulk of Uganda’s productive enterprises and account for more
than 50% of its GDP. Thus, microfinance cannot overcome the chronic shortage of




expansion of unregulated SACCOs, ROSCAs and MFIs causes concern about the
safety of small-balance deposits, which they illegally hold. Some of these institutions
use subsidized funds from the government supported Microfinance Support Centre,
whichmightintroducedistortionsbyweakeningthecreditcultureandthusundermine
theviabilityoftheseinstitutions.
Since the reforms aforementioned, the banking industry has been strengthened in
manyimportantaspectsandisnowstrongerandmorevibrantbutstillunderdeveloped
compared with other developing countries. Financial deepening has shown a positive9 RESEARCH PAPER 203
trend, in part achieved through effective supervision and enforcement of prudential
regulationsinthebankingsystem,alongwithincreasedfrequencyofon-siteinspections
andsurveillance.Inaddition,improvementsinsupervisionmethodologyandtheprudent
management of monetary and exchange rate policy by the Bank of Uganda have
contributed to strengthening the financial sector. This indeed has contributed to
minimizing the non-performing assets (NPA) as well as enhancing the profitability of
the sector. NPAfell from 29% of the portfolio in 1999 to 12% in 2000 and further to
3.9%in2007.ThecleanupoftheportfoliooftheerstwhileUgandaCommercialBank,




of funds for development finance, and is dominated by commercial banks. Basic
indicatorsoffinancialdevelopment,suchasthebroad-money/GDPandcurrency-broad
money ratios, suggest that the financial sector is still underdeveloped (Figure 1). As
showninTable1,whichcomparessomeEastAfricanCommunitycountries,whilethe
levels of liquid liabilities to GDP, bank deposits to GDPand private credit to GDPare
similartothoseinTanzania,theyarebelowthoseofKenyaandtheoverallaveragefor
sub-SaharanAfricaandthelow-incomegroup.Thebankingsystemalsointermediates
a smaller share of deposits into credit to the private sector, as indicated by the lower
loan-deposit ratio than in comparator countries. Interest margin and overhead costs
arehigher thanincomparatorcountries,suggestinginefficienciesinthesystem,which
mayariseoutofitssmallsize,higheroperatingcosts,and/orlowlevelsofcompetition.
A significant proportion of deposits consists of foreign exchange typically held at
international banks; a large part of these deposits is not invested onshore but placed in
the international money markets.
Inaddition,thesystemisdominatedbythecommercialbankingsector,whichby2007
accounted for almost 80% of total sector assets. Other financial intermediaries are
limitedinnumber,smallinsizeandrelativelyineffective.Consequently,onlyalimited
number of financial instruments are available for savings mobilization, liquidity
managementandportfoliodiversification.
Table 1: Financial intermediation across countries, 2004


























Uganda 5.8% 14.9% 38.9% 7.9% 13.4% 9.1% 35.0% 32.0%
Kenya 22.6% 34.9% 60.1% 6.1% 6.7% 5.1% 24.0% 16.0%
Tanzania 6.8% 16.7% 40.9% 7.0% 7.7% 6.4% 20.0% 37.0%
SSA 19.1% 23.6% 74.2% 6.1% 8.3% 6.7%
Low-
income
15.0% 22.1% 70.0% 5.9% 7.5% 6.2%11 RESEARCH PAPER 203
B
anking efficiency is instrumental to economic development (Fry, 1995; Barajas,
et al., 2000; Chirwa, 2001; Randell, 1998). Inefficiencies in the financial sys
tems of most developing countries have persisted even though many of these
countries have undertaken financial liberalization over the past two decades or so.
Gelbard and Leite (1999) observe that in many Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries
the range of financial products remains extremely limited, interest rate spreads are
wide, capital adequacy ratios are often insufficient, loan recovery is a problem and the
share of non-performing loans is large. The expectation is that removing government
controls on interest rates and lifting barriers to entry into the financial system would
lead to greater competition and improve performance of the financial institutions. A
number of studies have argued that unless bank behaviour changes, financial
liberalization cannot be expected to lead to a significant improvement in the efficiency
of the financial system.
There are several explanations for limited changes in the financial system
efficiency following financial liberalization. First, following Bain’s (1951) market
structure, conduct and performance hypothesis in the industrial organization literature,
poor performance may persist if financial sector reforms do not significantly alter the
structure within which banks operate. Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994) point out that
competitive pressures resulting from conditions of free entry and competitive pricing
will raise the functional efficiency of intermediation by decreasing the spread between
deposits and lending rates. Although the empirical evidence of a positive and significant
relationship between market structure and banks’ performance yields non-robust results,
there is compelling evidence to suggest that market structure plays an important role in
altering the performance of banks (Gilbert, 1984; Berger and Hannan, 1989; Molyneux
and Forbes, 1995; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). The most recent literature
(Barajas et al., 1999, 2000) supports the hypothesis that banks performance indicators
are positively related to market power.
Second, the removal of credit controls during financial liberalization may worsen
the quality of loans, which may in turn lead to increased risks of systemic crises.
3.  Literature review
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BrownbridgeandKirkpatrick(2000)notethatliberalizationofinterestratesandremoval
ofcreditcontrolsmayallowthosethatarenotconstrainedbyprudentialregulationsto
invest in risky assets in order to maintain larger market shares. This may reduce the
quality of assets and may result in a higher proportion of non-performing loans and
provisionsfordoubtfuldebts.Bankstendtooffsetthecostofscreeningandmonitoring
attributable to bad loans or the cost of forgone interest revenue by charging higher
lending rates (Barajas et al., 1999). These responses are likely to affect the banking
sector’s performance. Randell (1998) finds support for the positive and significant
association between poor bank performance and provisions for doubtful debts in the
Caribbean countries. Barajas et al., (1999, 2000) further confirm that the cost of poor
quality assets is shifted to bank customers through higher spreads in the Colombian
financialsystem.BrockandRojas-Suarez(2000),however,findasignificantnegative
relationship in the cases ofArgentina and Peru.
Third, there is overwhelming empirical evidence that high non-financial costs are
also a source of persistent inefficiency in the banking sector in developing countries.
Non-financial costs reflect variations in physical capital costs, employment and wage
levels. High non-financial costs may result from inefficiency in bank operations that
may also be shifted to bank customers, particularly in imperfect markets. Dermirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga (1999) find evidence of a negative relationship between bank
performance and overhead costs. Barajas et al. (1999, 2000) and Brock and Rojas-
Suarez(2000)alsofindsignificantevidenceofthepositiverelationshipbetweenbank
inefficiencyandnon-financialcosts.
Fourth, macroeconomic instability and the policy environment may also affect the
pricing behaviour of commercial banks and therefore their performance. In order to
capturetheeffectsofthemacroeconomicandpolicyenvironment,thebankperformance
equations include inflation, growth of output and money market real interest rates as
controlvariables.Forexample,Claessensetal.(2001),Dermirguc-KuntandHuizinga
(1999), and Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) note that banking industry performance
and inflation are negatively associated.
Insummary,whilstfinancialliberalizationshouldgenerallyleadtoimprovedbanking
sector performance, whether actual improvement occurs will depend on a number of
factors. Generally, banks’ efficiency can increase or remain low depending on the
competitiveness of the banking system, the cost structure of the market, the
sophistication of the banking system and the macroeconomic environment.
Accordingtotheliteratureonindustrialorganization,therearetwomainexplanations
for the likely impact of market structure on the conduct and performance of firms:
market power and efficiency. The market power explanation has two hypotheses: the
Structure-Conduct–Performance (SCP) hypothesis and the Relative Market Power
(RMP)hypothesis.Thetraditionalstructure-conduct-performancehypothesisisbased
on the proposition that the persistence of economic profits is indicative of allocative
distortions, and is due to some features of market structure that foster collusion and
retard competition among firms in the industry (Bain, 1951). Since concentration
facilitatescollusiveormonopolisticpractices,firmsinconcentratedmarketswillearn
higher profits than firms operating in less concentrated markets irrespective of their
efficiency.Thishypothesissuggeststhatbanksinconcentratedmarketswouldbeable13 RESEARCH PAPER 203
to extract monopolistic rents by their ability to offer low deposit rates and high loan
rates. For its part, the relative market power hypothesis states that only firms with
largemarketsharesandwell-differentiatedproductsareabletoexercisemarketpower
in pricing these products and earning supernormal profits (Shepherd, 1986).
Incontrasttothesetwomarketpowertheories,therearetwoefficiencyexplanations
of the positive relationship between profits and either concentration or market share,
that is, of the positive profit-structure relationship. The X-efficiency version of the
efficient-structure hypothesis posited by Demsetz (1973) asserts that efficient firms
increaseinsizeandmarketsharebecauseoftheirsuperiorityinproducingandmarketing
products.Here,thepositiveprofit-structurerelationshipisspurious,ratherthanofdirect
origin, with efficiency driving both profits and market structure. It is due to such
expansion that the degree of concentration of a market increases, while at the same
time the firms increase their profits.
Under theScale-efficiencyversionoftheefficient-structure(ES)hypothesis,firms
have essentially equally good management and technology, but some firms simply
produce at more efficient scales than others, and therefore have lower unit costs and
higher unit profits. These firms are assumed to have large market shares that may
resultinhighlevelsofconcentration,againyieldingapositiveprofit-structurerelationship
as a spurious outcome (Lambson, 1987). The two market power hypotheses have
radicallycontrastingimplicationsfromthetwoefficient-structurehypotheses.
The traditional concerns about concentration in product markets focuses on the
sociallossassociatedwiththeexerciseofmarketpowerathighlevelsofconcentration.
Thehigherpricesinconcentratedmarketsbringaboutarestrictionofoutputrelativeto
the competitive level and thereby misallocate resources. The social cost of this
misallocationhasbeenapproximatedbythedifferencebetweenlossinconsumersurplus
andgaininproducersurplusoccasionedbynon-competitivepricing.Anotherpossible
social loss associated with the exercise of market power focuses on lessened effort by
managers to maximize operating efficiency because competitive pressure is reduced.
Thus,inadditiontothetraditionallyreorganizedhigherpricesandreducedoutputfrom
marketpower,theremayalsobehighercostperunitofoutputinconcentratedmarkets
because of slack management (Berger and Hannan, 1989; Caves and Barton, 1990).









as a result. In addition, the price cushion provided by market power may simply allow
inefficientmanagersorpracticestopersistwithoutanyintentiontopursuegoalsother
than maximizing bank value. The lack of market discipline in concentrated markets
maysimplyblunttheeconomicsignalsthatwouldnormallyforcechangesinmanagement




markets may take advantage of market power, but much of the benefit of this power
may be manifested as higher costs rather than as higher profits.
Anumberofstudies,mostofthemindevelopedcountries,havebeencarriedoutto
testthesehypothesesbutthereisnoconclusiveevidenceinrelationtoeither(Shepherd,
1986; Smirlock et al., 1984; Smirlock, 1985; Evanoff and Fortier, 1988; Berger and
Hannan, 1989; Berger, 1995; Goldberg and Rai, 1996).
The most recent refinements to the tests of the two hypotheses are done by Berger
(1995), who uses direct measures of both X-efficiency and scale-efficiency in the
empiricalanalysisinordertoexplainwhetherthestructure-profitrelationshipreflects
superior management or greater market power of firms with large market shares. His
results provide no conclusive evidence to support fully either of the two hypotheses.
As a first-order effect, one would expect increased competition in the financial
sector to lead to lower costs and enhanced efficiency, even allowing for the fact that
financial products are heterogeneous. Recent research has highlighted, however, that
the relationships between competition and banking system performance, access to
financing,stabilityandgrowtharemorecomplex(Vives,2001).Marketpowerinbanking,
for example, may up to a degree be beneficial for access to financing.
Usingbankleveldatafor77countries,Demirguc-Kunt,Leaven,andLevine(2004)
investigate the impact of bank concentration and regulations on bank efficiency.They
find that concentration has a negative and significant effect on the efficiency of the
banking system except in rich countries with well-developed financial systems and
more economic freedoms.
Overall,theevidenceonthestructure-performancerelationshipinbankingismixed,
and this is one area that has remained inconclusive in both methodology of testing the
relationship and the results. Whereas Berger (1995) and Goldberg and Rai (1996)
make a significant contribution to the methodology of testing the two hypotheses by
includingmeasuresofefficiencydirectlyintotheprofitfunction,thederivedefficiency
measure may be biased since it does not isolate shifts in the efficiency frontier due to
technical change from changes in the average efficiency of banks. Rapid technical
progress that leads to the production of more output with the given level of inputs
could, for instance, result in lower average bank efficiency even if banks became
increasinglyproductiveovertime.
These new empirical industrial organization approaches measure competition and






are derived from profit-maximizing equilibrium conditions. The model of Bresnahan
(1982) and Lau (1982), uses the condition of general market equilibrium. The basic
ideaisthatprofit-maximizingfirmsinequilibriumwillchoosepricesandquantitiessuch15 RESEARCH PAPER 203
thatmarginalcostsequaltheir(perceived)marginalrevenue,whichcoincideswiththe
demandpriceunderperfectcompetitionorwiththeindustry’smarginalrevenueunder
perfect collusion. The Rosse-Panzar (R–P) model works well with firm-specific data
on revenues and factor prices, allows for bank-specific differences in production
function,anddoesnotrequireinformationaboutequilibriumoutputpricesandquantities
forthefirmor/andindustry.Inaddition,theRosse-Panzarmodelisrobusteveninsmall
empirical samples, while the Bresnahan-Lau mark-up model tends to exhibit an
anticompetitivebiasinsmallsamples(Shaffer,2001).
A number of studies have applied either the Bresnahan or the Panzar and Rosse
methodologytotheissueofcompetitioninthefinancialsector,althoughmostlytothe
bankingsystemspecifically.Forexample,Shaffer(1989)studiesasampleofUSbanks
and finds results that strongly reject collusive conduct, but are consistent with perfect
competition. Using the same model, Shaffer (1993) finds that the Canadian banking
system was competitive over the period 1965–1989, although being relatively
concentrated. Shaffer (2001) uses the Bresnahan model for 15 countries in North
America,Europe,andAsiaduring1979–91.Hefindssignificantmarketpowerinfive
markets and excess capacity in one market. Estimates were consistent with either
contestability or Cournot type oligopoly in most of these countries. Shaffer (1982)
applies the P–R model to a sample of NewYork banks using data for 1979 and found
monopolisticcompetition.NathanandNeave(1989)studiesCanadianbanksusingthe
PR methodology and found results consistent with the results of Shaffer (1989) using
the Bresnahan methodology, i.e., rejection of monopoly power. Several papers have
applied the PR methodology to European banking system (Molyneux et al., 1994; De
Bandt and Davis, 2000). Generally, these studies reject both perfect collusion and
perfect competition, and find mostly evidence of monopolistic competition. Tests on
thecompetitivenessofbankingsystemsfordevelopingcountriesandtransitioneconomies
using these models are few to date.17 RESEARCH PAPER 203
Variables marked with an asterisk (*) represent equilibrium values. Market power
is measured by the extent to which a change in factor input prices is reflected in the





















The first market model Panzar and Rosse investigated describes monopoly. The
monopoly analysis includes the case of price-taking competitive firms, as long as the
prices they face are truly exogenous, that is, as long as their equilibrium values are
unaffected by changes in the other exogenous variables in the model. An empirical
refutationof“monopoly”constitutesarejectionoftheassumptionthattherevenuesof
thebanksinquestionareindependentofthedecisionsmadebytheiractualorpotential
rivals. Panzar and Rosse proved that under monopoly, an increase in input prices will
increasemarginalcosts,reduceequilibriumoutputandsubsequentlyreducerevenues;
hence H will be zero or negative. This is a very generalized result, requiring little
beyond the profit maximization hypothesis itself. Along similar lines, Vesala (1995)
proves that the same result holds for monopolistic competition without the threat of
entry, i.e., with a fixed number of banks.Thus, this case also falls under monopoly. In
the case where the monopolist faces a demand curve of constant price elasticity e>1
and where a constant returns to scale, Cobb–Douglas technology is employed, Panzar
and Rosse proved that H is equal to e–1. Hence apart from the sign, the magnitude of
H mayalsobeofimportance,asH yieldsanestimateoftheLernerindexofmonopoly
power, L = [(e–1)/e] = H/(H–1).
Three other commonly employed models for an industrial market investigated by
Panzar and Rosse are monopolistic competition, perfect competition and conjectural
variation oligopoly, all of which happen to be consistent with positive values for H.In
these models, the revenue function of an individual bank depends on the decisions




a set of general assumptions,,it can be proved that under monopolistic competition,





and is consistent with the observation that banks tend to differ with respect to product
qualityvariablesandadvertising,althoughtheircorebusinessisfairlyhomogeneous.
In the limited case of the monopolistic competition model, where banks’ products
are regarded as perfect substitutes of one another, the Chamberlinian model producesCOMPETITION AND PERFORMANCE IN UGANDA’S BANKING SYSTEM 18
theperfectlycompetitivesolution,asdemandelasticityapproachesinfinity.Inthisperfect
competition case, H=1. An increase in input prices raises both marginal and average
costswithout–undercertainconditions–alteringtheoptimaloutputofanyindividual
firm. Exit of some firms increases the demand faced by each of the remaining firms,
leading to an increase in prices and revenues equivalent to the rise in costs.
Finally,analysingtheconjecturalvariationoligopolycase,PanzarandRosseshow
that strategic interactions among a fixed number of banks may also be consistent with
positive values of H. In general, the value of H is not restricted. In the special case of
perfectcollusionoligopolyoraperfectcartel,thevalueofHisnon-positive,similarto
the monopoly model. Table 2 summarizes the discriminatory power of H.
TheChamberlinianequilibriummodeldescribedaboveprovidesasimplelinkbetween
H and the number of banks, between market behaviour and market structure. The
modelisbasedonfreeentryofbanksanddeterminesnotonlytheoutputlevelbutalso
theequilibriumnumberofbanks.Vesala(1995)provesthatHisanincreasingfunction
of the demand elasticity e, that is, the less market power is exercised on the part of
banks, the higher H becomes. This implies that H is not used solely to reject certain
types of market behaviour, but that its magnitude serves as a measure of competition.
OneofthegeneralassumptionsunderlyingtheChamberlinianequilibriummodelisthat
the elasticity of perceived demand facing the individual firm, e(x,n,w), is a non-
decreasingfunctionofthenumberofrivalbanks.PanzarandRossecallthisastandard
assumption,eminentlyplausibleandalmostatruism.Vesala’sresultandthisassumption
together provide a positive (theoretical) relationship between H and the number of
banks, or – in a loose interpretation – an inverse relationship between H and banking
concentration.
De Bandt and Davis (2000) show that the P–R approach requires a number of
working assumptions. First, banks must be treated as single product firms. Consistent
with the intermediation approach to banking, banks are viewed as producing
intermediation services using labour, physical capital and financial capital as inputs.
Second, higher input prices must not be correlated with higher quality services that
generate higher revenues, because such a correlation would bias the computed H
statistic. This means, however, that if one rejects the hypothesis of a contestable
competitivemarket,thebiascannotbetoolarge(Molyneuxetal.,1996).Third,banks
mustbeinlong-runequilibrium.
Table 2: Discriminatory power of H
Value of H Competitive environment
0 ≤ H Monopoly equilibrium; each bank operates independently as
under monopoly profit maximization condition (H is a decreasing
function of the perceived demand elasticity) or perfect cartel.
1 0 < < H Monopolistic competition; free entry equilibrium (H is an
increasing function of the perceived demand elasticity)
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Market concentration and competition in
Uganda’s banking sector
U
ganda’s banking system is highly concentrated. This is not surprising, given
the small size of the national market. Concentrated banking systems are not
necessarily uncompetitive – for example, in open systems, the threat of entry
can restrain incumbents from overcharging (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Demirgüç-
Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004). But concentration does often go hand in hand with
market power, especially when contestability is weak. Indeed, economic theory provides
conflicting predictions about the relationship between the concentration and the
competitiveness of the banking industry and the fragility of the banking system. Some
theoretical arguments and country comparisons suggest that a less concentrated banking
sector with many banks is more prone to financial crises than a concentrated banking
sector with a few banks (Allen and Gale, 2004). First, concentrated banking systems
may enhance market power and boost bank profits. High profits provide a “buffer”
against adverse shocks and increase the charter or franchise value of the bank, reducing
incentives for bank owners and managers to take excessive risk and thus reducing the
probability of systemic banking distress (Hellman et al., 2000; Matutes and Vives,
2000). Second, some hold that it is substantially easier to monitor a few banks in a
concentrated banking system than it is to monitor many banks in a diffuse banking
system. From this perspective, supervision of banks will be more effective and the
risks of contagion and thus systemic crisis less pronounced in a concentrated banking
system.
Some proponents of the “concentration–stability” view argue that holding other
things constant, banks in concentrated systems will be larger than banks in more diffuse
systems, and larger banks tend to be better diversified than smaller banks. These
assumptions suggest that concentrated banking systems with a few large banks will be
less fragile than banking systems with many small banks. Models by Diamond (1984),
Boyd and Prescott (1986), Allen (1990), and others predict economies of scale in
intermediation.
An opposing view is that a more concentrated banking structure enhances bank
fragility. First, proponents of this view argue that the standard argument that market
power in banking boosts profits and hence bank stability ignores the potential impact of
banks’ market power on firm behaviour. Concentrated banking systems could enhance
market power, which allows banks to boost the interest rate they charge to firms.
These higher interest rates may induce firms to assume greater risk. Thus, there could
be a positive relationship between concentration and bank fragility and therefore the
probability of systemic distress (Caminal and Matutes, 2002). They also note that less
competition can lead to less credit rationing, larger loans and higher probability of
failure if loans are subject to multiplicative uncertainty. Second, advocates of the
“concentration–fragility” view argue that  relative to diffuse banking systems,
concentrated banking systems generally have fewer banks and that policy makers are
more concerned about bank failures when there are only a few banks. Banks in
concentrated systems can then be assumed to tend to receive larger subsidies through￿
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period after 1999 (See Table 10). For both regressions, the coefficient of the
concentration index shows the expected negative sign indicating that competition is
decreasing with increasing market concentration. There is no one-to-one relationship
between concentration and competition, however. The dummy variable is also
statistically significant indicating the change in concentration and competition after
1999.
Efficiency and market structure
A
s a first order effect, one would expect increased competition to lead to lower
costsandenhancedefficiency.AsVives(2001)highlights,however,therelationship
betweencompetitionandbankingsystemperformanceismorecomplex.Marketpower
in banking, for example, may up to a degree be beneficial for access to financing and
theviewthatcompetitionisunambiguouslygoodforfinancialsectorperformancecould




opaque banks, and the more likely it provides credit (Vives, 2001). More competition
canthenunderminetheincentivesofbankstoinvestinarelationship.Buttherelationship
involves sunk costs and leads to a hold-up problem: the incumbent bank has more
informationabouttheborrowerthanitscompetitors.Thisincreasestheswitchingcosts
for the borrower, especially for better quality borrowers since they will face adverse
conditionswhentryingtolookforfinancingfromanotherbank,astheywillbeperceived
as a poor credit risk. Borrowers will be less willing to enter a relationship with a bank
if they are less likely to be subjected to a hold-up problem, for example, when the
market for external financing is more competitive. The net effect of these problems
canvarywiththeoverallcompetitiveenvironment.BootandThakor(2000),forexample,
Table 10: Competition and concentration relationship
Dependent variable - H

























Adj. R-square 0.45 0.51 0.50
t -values in parenthesesCOMPETITION AND PERFORMANCE IN UGANDA’S BANKING SYSTEM 32
show that increased inter-bank competition may induce banks to make not less, but
morerelationshiploans.Therecanalsobeeffectsfromthetypeofinformationproblem
on the scope for potential competition.
The existence of a relationship between market structure and banks’ behaviour is
indicatedby,amongothers,theP–Rmodeldescribedintheprecedingsection.However,
the P–R model puts at the backstage the relevance of market structure for banks’
conduct and performance and, as a description of the market structure, it is rather
limited. For instance, it fully ignores the size distribution of banks (or inequality) in a
market.Moreover,DeYoung(1998)suggeststhatbankmanagementqualityispositively
relatedtocostefficiency,whichisinturnrelatedtoassetquality.Thus,robustevidence
is essential, on one hand, to corroborate the monopolistic market structure evidence
obtainedundertheP–Rframeworkand,ontheotherhand,toexaminehowthemarket
structure affects the performance of the banks. To achieve this, we analyse bank
efficiency and how it relates to bank returns in the following section. Here, the aim is
to measure the degree of X-inefficiency in Uganda’s commercial banks and how it





from the fully efficient amount of output as represented by the efficient production
frontier.TheempiricalestimationofX-efficiencyhasresultedinanextensiveliterature
addressing both the econometric theory of efficiency estimation and the empirical
application of the concepts in different situations. Of the approaches used to estimate
frontiers and the inefficiency component, the two most popular are stochastic frontier
analysis (SFA) and data envelopment analysis (DEA). SFA is a regression approach
that typically includes a normally distributed error and an inefficiency component
assumed to follow a one-sided distribution (e.g., exponential, gamma). The data
envelopmentapproachassumesthattherearerandomfluctuations,sothatalldeviations
from the estimated frontier represent inefficiency. If there is any luck or measurement
error in an observation not on the estimated frontier, it will be mistakenly included in
that firm’s measured efficiency. If there is a random error in an observation on the
frontier, it will be mistakenly reflected in the measured efficiency of all firms that are
measured relative to that part of the frontier. The choice of any specific approach
depends upon the research objectives and available data, but the non-parametric
approachishighlysensitivetooutliersandparametricmodelsareconsideredrelatively
more robust. Both methods have their strengths and weaknesses. SFA is stochastic,
but requires the choice of a functional form and an ad hoc assumption about the
distribution of the inefficiency component. DEA does not require distributional
assumptions or a specific functional form, but it is non-stochastic. Because of this
limitation, we lean towards SFA.
One way to test for the competition hypotheses of market share and concentration
is to take both market share and concentration into account at the same time by
estimating a performance equation that includes both market share and concentration
asindependentvariablesandtoexaminethesignificanceoftheircoefficients(Smirlock,( ) ε π + =
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RMP, efficiency and scale-efficiency), is of the form:
( ) . , , , it it it it it Z EFF M C f ε π + = (15)
Under the ES hypothesis, the coefficient of the appropriate efficiency variable is
positive and the coefficients of all the other key variables are either relatively small or
zero. Similarly, under the MPhypothesis the appropriate market structure variable C,
or M, has a positive coefficient and the remaining variables are irrelevant. The
disturbance term is assumed to follow a one-way error component process: eit = mi
+uit. Where mi represents any unobservable bank specific effects that are not included
in the regression, e.g., unobservable managerial skills of the managers of banks. They
are fixed parameters and can be estimated by introducing a dummy variable for each
bank. uit varies by bank and by time and represents all other market imperfections and
regulatory restrictions that affect the return on assets (ROA) of banks randomly.
A second condition for the ES hypothesis is that the market structure variables (M
and C) be positively related to efficiency. In order to test for this additional condition,
the following reduced-form equations can be estimated:
( ) it it it it Z EFF f M 5 , ε + = (16)




widely to banking and other industries. SFA starts with a standard cost or profit
function and estimates the minimum cost or maximum profit frontier for the entire
samplefrombalancesheetdata.Theefficiencymeasureforaspecificbankobservation
is its distance from the frontier. A standard multi-product translog cost function is
specified and deviations from the cost frontier are estimated based on it.
The analysis of inefficiency in this modelling framework consists of two (or three)
steps.Atthefirst,wewillobtainestimatesofthetechnologyparameters.Thisestimation
stepalsoproducesestimatesoftheparametersofthedistributionsoftheerrortermsin
the model (sw and su). In the analysis of inefficiency, these structural parameters may
or may not hold any intrinsic interest for the analyst. With the parameter estimates in
hand,itispossibletoestimatethecomposeddeviation,jit=uit–wit=yit–b¢xit,byplugging
intheobserveddataforbanksinyeartandtheestimatedparameters.But,theobjective
is estimation of wit not uit, which contains the bank-specific heterogeneity. Note that
theestimatoristheexpectedvalueoftheinefficiencytermgivenanobservationonthe
sum of inefficiency and the firm specific heterogeneity.The estimated wit is then used
inregressionanalysisofprofitabilityonwit(theestimates)andotherinterestingcovariates
in order to explain how profitability is affected by efficiency.
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The first is cost inefficiency. The cost concept assumes that the primary objective of
the bank is to minimize cost (Berger, 1995).We illustrate the methodology using cost
efficiency as follows. Suppose that total costs for the i-th bank in year t, Cit, are given
by Equation 18 in which yit represents the various products or services produced by
the bank and Pit represents the prices of inputs. The random disturbance term has two
components; Vit represents measurement error and other uncontrollable factors, while
wit represents technical and allocative inefficiency aspects that can be influenced by
management.
Hence, we have:
( ) ( ) it it it it it V P y f C ω + + = , (18)
As is common in the efficiency literature, we use a translog specification for the
cost function in (18) with the standard symmetry and homogeneity assumptions.
The second way of measuring X-inefficiency is by analysing profit inefficiency
(Berger, 1995; Goldberg and Rai, 1996). The analysis is based on a standard profit
function. The standard profit function seeks to maximize profits at a given level of
inputandoutputprices.Itthereforetakesintoaccountinputpricesaswellasrevenues
generatedfromoutput.Outputpricesaretakenasexogenous,however,whichimplies
that maximizing profit is determined by the input inefficiencies. The standard profit
function is given by: it=f(yit, Pit) + (Vit + wit), where is profit.
The SFA approach maintains that managerial or controllable inefficiencies, i.e.,
ωit, increase costs only above, or profits only below, the frontier or best practice
levels. Random fluctuations, i.e., Vit, may either increase or decrease costs or profits
from these benchmarks. Hence, the frontier itself is stochastic and the term ωit
represents inefficiency or the distance from best practice.
Furthermore,theVittermsareassumedtobeidenticallydistributedasnormalvariates
with zero mean and variance equal to
2
V σ . The wit terms are non negative random
variables distributed normally but truncated below zero. We assume that the wit terms
are distributed independently but not identically. Hence, for the i-th bank in year t,
technical inefficiency, wit, is assumed to follow a half normal distribution, i.e.,
( )
2 ,
it it N ω σ µ ,inwhichboththemeanmitandvariance
2




frontiers that allow for a mean shift or for a heteroscedastic variance.
Thestochasticfrontierapproachassumesthattheoutputofafirmwillvaryfromits
frontier as a result of two economically distinguishable random disturbances, wit and
ui. The disturbance wit reflects the fact that the output of each firm must lie on or
below its frontier. Any such deviation is the result of factors under the control of the
firm, e.g., technical and economic inefficiency and the will and effort of the producer
and the employees. The frontier itself is stochastic because of unpredictable factors≤ ν ≥
ω σ
β ω ν ϕ ʹ − = + =
ω ϕ
( ) [ ] { } − − = η ω ω
η ω
( ) ω −
ω ν ϕ − =
( ) [ ] ϕ ω =
( ) ω
ϕ
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
( ) − Φ −
− Φ −
× + − = −
σ μ
σ μ σ η
σ η μ η ϕ ω
σ η η σ













= ( ) • Φ




[ ] ν ω σ σ σ + = ν ω σ σ λ =
σ λ ϕ ± =
∞
ω ν γ λ γ + + + + =￿￿ m m t









Table 11: Stochastic frontier estimates





0.38 0.48 0.43 0.90
0.768 0.824 0.794 0.867
0.661 Mean e￿ciency
Standard errors are in parentless for the estimated parameters. In the heteroscedastic 
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Bankefficiencyandperformance
The econometric analysis is based on Equations 15, 16, and 17 using return of assets
(ROA) as a proxy for gross profits (performance). We use this measure because it
represents the benefits obtained by the banks before taxes, provision for insolvency
andextraordinaryitems,andreflectsthedifferencebetweenearningsandcostsderived
from lending and from bank services. We have used gross profits rather than net
profits after taxes because net profits would capture the effects of random factors that
are sometimes beyond the firm’s control. This closely follows the Berger (1995)
methodology,whichincorporatesefficiencymeasuresdirectlyintothebankperformance
function summarized in Equation 8, in order to distinguish between the effects of
efficiency from the effects of market power on the structure-profitability relationship.
Weuseefficiencyscorederivedfromthecostefficiencystochasticfrontierasameasure






variables. These are of no significance in the Ugandan case and as such the Berger
(1995) model cannot be duplicated in Uganda.
In addition, we control for the effects of asset quality and risk on the level of bank
efficiencybydeductingnon-performingloansfromearningassets,definedasoutputof
banks.Insodoing,weavoidoverstatingthelevelofefficiencyofbanks.Forinstance,
banks scrimping on credit evaluations or producing excessively risky loans might be
labelled as efficient when compared with banks spending resources to ensure that
their loans are of higher quality.
Grangercausalitytests
Amajormethodologicalconcernistheendogeneityproblem,asbankefficiencycould
affect market share and concentration; hence estimating the equations as specified in
Equations 7, 8, and 9 would bias the estimated effects.
Toinvestigatewhetherthereisanendogeneityproblem,weusetheGrangercausality
test. Causality is said to exist if a variable Xt, in this case EFF, helps to improve the
forecastsofanothervariable(s)Yt,inthiscaseconcentrationandmarketshare.Denoting
by Ω +h t Y the optimal − h step forecast of Yt at origin t based on the set of all the
relevant information in the universe t Ω , we may define Xt to be Granger-non causal
for Yt if and only if
Ω = Ω + + h t h t Y Y \{ } t s s t X ≤ , 3, . ,......... 2 , 1 = h (21)








to industry performance. This view assumes that banks in a concentrated market can
ignore potential competitors and stay inefficient because there are technological and
regulatory barriers to entry; the implication is that concentration in the industry can





consequence not of market power but of the greater efficiency of firms with larger
market shares. In other words, the superior performance of the market leaders
endogenouslydeterminesthemarketstructure,implyingthathigherefficiencyproduces
bothhigherconcentrationandgreaterprofitability.AccordingtoESH,highlyefficient
banks (owing to firm-specific factors such as technological or managerial skills, etc.)
can maximize their profits by reducing prices and expanding bank size, thus gaining
marketshareattheexpenseofotherrelativelyinefficientfirms.Fromthesearguments,
one could conclude that bank efficiency serves as the leading force to market
concentration.
Alternatively, non-structural models do not infer the competitive conduct of banks
through the analysis of market structure, but rather recognize that banks behave
differentlydependingonthemarketstructureinwhichtheyoperate.Thebasictenetof
these models is that there is no clear evidence that the use of market power would be
greaterinmoreconcentratedindustries.Underthisframework,theContestableMarkets
Theory stresses that a concentrated industry can behave competitively if the barriers
for new entrants to the market are low. This assumes that banks can enter or leave
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rapidly any market without losing their capital. Therefore the incumbent banks are
alwaysvulnerabletohit-and-runentrywhentheytrytoexercisetheirpotentialmarket
power.
This paper contributes to this debate by attempting to use the two approaches to
measure bank competition and the degree of X-inefficiency in commercial banks in
Uganda and then attempts to investigate how the degree of efficiency affects banks
profitability in relation to efficient structure hypothesis. It also uses banking market
share and concentration as measures of market structure to analyse how the market
structureaffectsprofitabilityinrelationtostructure–conduct–performancehypothesis.
Whilesomeoftheserelationshipsbetweencompetitionandbankingsystemperformance
and stability have been analysed in the developed countries, empirical research in
developingcountriesisatbeststillatinfancy.Inparticular,thispapermakesimportant
contributionstotheliteratureonbankefficiencyandhowitaffectsbanks’performance,
since most studies on the efficiency and market structure of banking systems have
focusedonnon-Africancountries.First,wecomplementotherstudiesonthenatureof
bank competition. Second, we investigate the interaction between competition and
concentration and finally, we examine how bank profitability is affected by market
structure and efficiency.
Using interest revenue and total revenue as ratios to total banks’ assets and also




while competition in the Ugandan banking sector falls within a range of estimates for
comparator markets, it tends to be on the weaker side. On the basis of the computed
market power coefficients, we conclude that Uganda’s banks seem to earn their
revenues,asifoperatingunderconditionsofmonopolisticcompetitionandconcentration
in banking markets does lead to a lower level of competition.
Inbankingservicessuchconditionsare,ofcourse,expectedapriorifromtheresults
of previous empirical studies and from economic theory, since banks are licensed,
regulated and supervised, and engage in product (service) differentiation. That is, the
study finds the H -statistic to be between 0 and 1, with an average value of 0.28 for
theentireperiodpointingtomonopolisticbehaviourofbanks,whichmayimpedefinancial
intermediation.Thereisalsoevidencethatcompetitionhasincreasedduringtheperiod
2000–2005 following the cleanup of the financial system, which could point to the
potentialbenefitsofstrengtheningtheregulatoryandsupervisoryframeworksinfostering
acompetitivebankingsystem.Thisresultisofnosurpriseasitconfirmsthefindingsof
a number of researchers. One implication that can be deduced from this result is that
sincethebankingsystemisheavilyconcentrated,smallbanksmaycomeunderpressure
ascompetitivepressuresbuildup,especiallysincethesupplyoftreasurybillsisdeclining
and these have been a major source of revenue. On the other hand, a reduction in net
treasury bill issuance may reduce the dependency of banks on government securities
asasourceoflow-risk,high-yieldingassets,whichcouldleadtoincreasedcompetition,
as banks would have to identify new lending opportunities and expand their customer
base in order to generate income.51
Notes
i This has included Stanbic Bank acquiring one of the largest and oldest banks, Uganda
CommercialBank,OrientbankacquiringoftheTrustBank,andrecentlyBarclaysacquiringthe
NileBank.
ii Note that the model is subject to several assumptions: banks are operating in long-run
equilibrium;theperformanceofthebanksisinfluencedbyotherparticipants’actions;thecost
structure is homogenous and the production function is a standard Cobb–Douglas function
with a constant returns to scale; and the price elasticity of demand is greater than unity.
iiiThe symbol A \B denotes the set of all elements of a set A not contained in the set . B53 RESEARCH PAPER 203
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Standard Chartered 0.795 0.82 0.245 0.072 0.029
Barclays 0.765 0.795 0.15 0.125 0.021
Baroda 0.682 0.754 0.052 0.145 0.012
Stanbic 0.751 0.812 0.324 0.091 0.032
Tropical 0.554 0.569 0.006 0.342 0.004
Crane 0.678 0.694 0.032 0.069 0.016
Cairo 0.723 0.761 0.009 0.015 0.008
Centenary Rural
Development
0.578 0.601 0.02 0.253 0.001
Nile 0.527 0.539 0.024 0.395 0.009
Allied 0.542 0.532 0.015 0.329 0.011
Orient 0.664 0.712 0.022 0.022 0.018
National Bank of
Commerce Ltd
0.552 0.538 0.001 0.287 0.0004
Diamond Trust Bank
(U) Ltd.
0.456 0.465 0.008 0.128 0.006
DFCU Bank Ltd. 0.718 0.735 0.027 0.174 0.0045
Citibank (U) Ltd. 0.935 0.958 0.065 0.031 0.025
Overall average 0.661 0.686
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Table A2: Regression results for market share and concentration
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Table A3: Summary of the results (fixed effects)
Production frontier: Translog functional form. Wald chi2(6)= 39133.10
Log likelihood = -342.53858 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z|
Lgtd 0.6358907 0.0251796 25.25 0.000
Lgrwages 0.0422995 0.0095044 4.45 0.000
Lgdint -0.0895473 0.0146479 -6.11 0.000
LgOrliab 0.8923581 0.091411 9.76 0.000
( ) rwages rtd lg . lg 5 . 0 0.1801718 0.0192669 9.35 0.000
( ) int lg . lg 5 . 0 r rtd 0.1273656 0.0192669 6.46 0.000
( ) orliab rtd lg . lg 5 . 0 -0.25522 0.0442361 -6.20 0.000
( ) int lg . lg 5 . 0 r rwages -0.0151 0.0019453 -7.89 0.000
( ) orliab rwages lg . lg 5 . 0 -0.04210 0.0310864 -1.72 0.151
( ) orliab r lg . int lg 5 . 0 0.060121 0.0180258 3.060 0.000
Lgtime -0.0543436 0.0398231 -1.36 0.172
consant 1.050939 0.1500237 7.01 0.000
ω 0.2719085 0.0977315 2.784 0.005
lnsigma2 -1.089894 0.4081715 -2.67 0.008
ilgtgamma -0.1081133 0.8592583 -0.13 0.900
2 σ 0.0062521 0.1372485 0.151 0.748
gamma 0.472998 0.2141881 0.1428 0.427
2
ω σ 0.1590466 0.1365699
2
ν σ 0.1772055 0.010617259 RESEARCH PAPER 203
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